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BEYOND CARVE-OUTS AND TOWARD 
RELIANCE: A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
FOR CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY CHOICE 
OF LAW 
John A. E. Pottow* 
The title of this Article purports to develop a normative framework for 
cross-border insolvency choice of law. That can be a task of varying scope, 
so at the outset any pretense of ambition for a wholly new choice of law 
model should be dispelled. Indeed, at the most generalized level, 
bankruptcy choice of law theory has already been fully ventilated in the 
well-rehearsed universalism versus territorialism debates.1 And it has been 
settled. The universalists, at least as a normative matter, appear to have 
won: choice of law, as it is increasingly accepted, should be determined by 
the debtor’s center of main interests (COMI).2 But no sooner did the 
universalists claim theoretical superiority than did they bow to 
concessions animated by such pragmatic concerns as reality, 
begetting the now-dominant paradigm of modified universalism.3 One 
could argue this raises a nomenclature question: is “modified 
universalism” an independent normative theory for choice of 
insolvency law in cross-border proceedings or is it merely a pragmatic 
gloss put on the universalist theory, which retains the normative 
theoretical core?4 For purposes of this Article, I prefer to cast modified 
universalism as its own normative theory. Modified 
* © John A. E. Pottow, John Philip Dawson Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Law School, 2014.  Thanks to all participants at the symposium for comments and especially Pete 
Osornio (Michigan J.D. Class of 2014) for research help. Ted Janger, the Center for the Study of 
Business Law and Regulation at Brooklyn Law School, and the International Insolvency Institute 
all get credit for the wisdom of the need for this symposium. 
1. E.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International
Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in 
Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991) 
[hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism]. 
2. See U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 
WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1997) [hereinafter 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW]; Council Regulation 1346/2000, On Insolvency Proceedings, art. 12, 
2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EU Insolvency Regulation]. 
3. See John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy,
45 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 952 (2005) [hereinafter Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism]. Although as 
others well note, universalism, “modified” enough, can dissolve into territorialism. Charles W. 
Mooney, Jr., Harmonizing Choice-of-Law Rules for International Insolvency Cases: Virtual 
Territoriality, Virtual Universalism, and the Problem of Local Interests, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
& COM. L. 129, 141–44 (2014); see also Edward J. Janger, Silos: Establishing the Distributional 
Baseline in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 83, 92 (2014) (noting 
that the EU proposals turn “modified universalism on its head by validating a virtual territorial 
approach to distribution”) [hereinafter Janger, Silos]; Edward J. Janger, Virtual Territoriality, 48 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 401, 418 (2010) [hereinafter Janger, Virtual Territoriality].  
4. See generally Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 3, at 952–53 (discussing
modified universalism’s outgrowth from universalism). 
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universalism is more specifically a second-order choice of law theory. It 
argues that the theoretical purity of universalism is desirable as a first-order 
matter, but because that purity is not yet attainable and because incremental 
advancement toward universalism is preferable to failed swings for the 
fences,5 a second-order approach is warranted. This second-order theory is 
mindful of pragmatic constraints and counsels that it is normatively 
desirable to “modify” universalism with some territorialist concessions.6 
Thus, non-trivial accommodation of local law not only can but also should 
be tolerated in cross-border insolvency proceedings.7 
Viewed in this manner, modified universalism is a form of 
incrementalism, a thus-far successful approach to cross-border insolvency 
reform. As deployed in the UNCITRAL Model Law,8 chapter 15 of the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 9  and to a large degree the EU Insolvency 
Regulation, 10 modified universalism is more specifically an instance of 
procedural incrementalism, a form of incrementalism that moves for 
gradually increasing subjugation of sovereignty on seemingly less 
threatening, procedural matters as a form of acclimation to the imposition 
of foreign law upon (or at least foreign court control over) domestic 
insolvency proceedings.11 As operationalized, the modified universalism of 
these current regimes finds doctrinal outlet in a presumptive universalist 
choice of law rule—COMI lex fori concursus—but which backtracks with a 
series of carve-outs under which local insolvency law can apply in non-
COMI states.12 We can thus fairly characterize the present state of affairs 
even more specifically as a carve-out-based regime of modified 
universalism. 
If this assessment is correct, that modified universalism—the stipulated 
normatively superior (at present) framework for cross-border insolvency—
pursues an incremental trajectory, then the question naturally arises: what is 
the next stage along this uncharted but dimly perceptible path toward fuller 
and complete universalism? Specifically, which carve-outs are ready for 
retirement to yield to COMI-state law? The question is not merely one of 
academic interest. UNCITRAL’s Working Group V has put the issue 
squarely in the crosshairs by seeking input for reforms from scholars and 
practitioners alike 13  with particular focus on choice of law issues 
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2276 (2000). 
7. See, e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 2, art. 28.
8. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 2.
9. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq (2012).
10. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 2.
11. See Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 3, at 952.
12. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 2; 11 U.S.C. § 1501; UNCITRAL MODEL LAW,
supra note 2.  
13. U.N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Rep. on its 45th
Sess., Apr. 21–25, 2014, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/803 (May 6, 2014). 
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(recognizing that as just mentioned, at a grander level the universalism-
territorialism debate is already one about choice of law).14 
The purpose of this Article is two-fold. First, this Article seeks to 
address the third-order choice of law considerations under present debate in 
answering the question of what’s next. That is, accepting universalism as a 
first-order normative theory, and then accepting modified universalism as a 
second-order normative theory, how might we theoretically anchor—as a 
matter of normative analysis—the best way to take the next step in 
reforming a carve-out-based choice of law regime? Rather than rely upon 
serendipitous fits and starts, which seem to drive the field to a certain extent 
in directing the vector of carve-out reform, this Article proposes a 
framework based on actual, defensive litigant reliance as the third-order 
theoretical principle to guide the doctrinal development within modified 
universalism. Second, this Article tries to flesh out some choice of law rules 
that might flow from, or at the very least be consistent with, such a reliance-
based normative framework. Because the prescriptive/evaluative aspect of 
this Article builds upon current efforts, however, it is first necessary to 
review the bidding of where cross-border insolvency reform has moved on 
choice of law. This Article thus divides into these three parts—reviewing 
the bidding, explaining the suggested framework, and assessing the current 
proposals —and unfolds accordingly (with one interlude). The reader 
should be forewarned before proceeding: we are deeply inside baseball 
here. This is a technical paper for experts; it assumes substantial familiarity 
with the subject matter of cross-border insolvency. You have been warned. 
I.  REVIEWING THE BIDDING: CURRENT CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY CHOICE OF LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
Modified universalism makes “give-backs” to territorialists in order to 
garner broader acceptance of projects like the EU Insolvency Regulation 
and UNCITRAL Model Law. There are two broad mechanisms through 
which these territorialist give-backs manifest themselves: choice of law 
carve-outs and secondary proceedings. (Technically, as the unassailable Ian 
Fletcher points out,15 the former mechanism—choice of law carve-outs—
can actually divide into two analytically distinct subsets: restriction on the 
scope of lex fori concursus, 16  and explicit selection of non-lex fori 
 14. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 3, at 944 (“In a critical respect, the 
‘problem’ of transnational insolvencies, at least at one level, might be nothing more than an 
admittedly challenging choice of law issue: whose (policy-rich) laws of distribution, priority, and 
avoidance should govern the insolvency of the multi-jurisdiction debtor?” ).   
 15. BOB WESSELS & IAN F. FLETCHER, AM. LAW INST., Global Rules on Conflict-of-Laws 
Matters in Insolvency Cases, in TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR 
COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES ann. at 200, 252–53 (2012), available at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/557/5932.htm [hereinafter GP Annex]. 
 16. E.g., EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 2, art. 6.   
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concursus for specific litigation matters, such as lex laboris. 17  While 
conceptually discrete, however, these are both carve-outs from the 
presumptive choice of law rule of lex fori concursus.) Let us first turn to the 
latter territorialist mechanism of lex fori concursus disapplication— 
secondary proceedings—in reviewing the current proposals to reform the 
EU Insolvency Regulation (and cognate innovations) from a modified 
universalist’s perspective. 
A. SECONDARY PROCEEDINGS: A NECESSARY EVIL 
Secondary proceedings, by contrast to the subject-specific choice of law 
exclusion of a carve-out, are wholesale vetoes of the COMI lex fori 
concursus, deploying what perhaps should be considered lex secondus. 
More precisely, secondary proceedings allow application of a different 
forum’s lex fori concursus upon the opening of the secondary proceeding in 
the new forum. While commentators, and not without reason, have 
characterized these secondary proceedings as enabling a local creditor veto 
over COMI law, blackmail, etc., 18  secondary proceedings can also be 
properly conceived, and perhaps even better conceived, as choice of law 
carve-outs writ large (albeit contingent). That is, when (but only when) the 
contingency arises that a local creditor possessing claims under local law 
chooses to open a secondary proceeding, then (but only then) the COMI 
state insolvency law will be presumptively displaced in favor of the local 
state’s insolvency law: lex secondus. 19  (Chapter 15 allows parallel 
proceedings under sections 1528–29, which are a looser form of secondary 
proceedings but have the same flavor of allowing for the primacy of local 
law, albeit in a territorially limited matter.)20 
From a normative perspective, secondary proceedings present 
something of an embarrassment to universalists. As I have argued 
elsewhere, however, secondaries are a necessary evil: a pit stop on the road 
 17. Id. art. 10.   
 18. Janger, Silos, supra note 3, at 85 (describing secondary proceedings as the “functional 
territorial [equivalent of] blackmail”).   
 19. Yes, I know, I am conflating choice of forum with choice of law. Jay Westbrook has 
already admonished us to keep the two distinct, see Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra 
note 1, at 461 (“[T]here is a difference between choice of forum, the explicit focus of the 
universalist rule, and choice of law, a result of universalism often implicitly assumed.”), and he is 
right, but as I have also already admonished, choice of forum can have, at times, important and 
even dispositive effects on choice of law. See John A. E. Pottow, The Maxwell Case, in 
BANKRUPTCY LAW STORIES 222, 229 (Robert K. Rasmussen  ed., 2007). Furthermore, local 
insolvency law can choose foreign law (including COMI law) on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis, as was indeed the implication of Maxwell. In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp. plc by Homan, 93 
F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 20. 11 U.S.C. § 1528 (2012) (“The effects of such case shall be restricted to the assets of the 
debtor that are within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . .”); 11 U.S.C. § 
1529(2)(B) (“[I]f such foreign proceeding is a foreign main proceeding, the stay and suspension 
referred to in section 1520(a) shall be modified or terminated if inconsistent with the relief granted 
in the United States.”). 
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toward universalism that was required to secure the buy-in of skeptical 
states. 21  For the modified universalist, secondary proceedings should be 
tolerated, but they should be slowly, in successive waves of reform, 
restricted in scope.22 
As a self-described universalist, I may have surprised some in seeming 
not just to apologize for but to applaud secondary proceedings.  
Specifically, I have endorsed the use of so-called “synthetic secondary 
proceedings” to treat foreign creditor priority claims in the COMI forum “as 
if” (to use Bob Wessel’s terminology)23 secondary proceedings have been 
opened. 24  There are reasons for this seeming capitulation. Synthetic 
secondaries are welcome in my view because they both reduce the value-
gobbling transaction costs of local proceedings and cabin the scope and 
incidence (by pre-emption) of true secondary proceedings. With increasing 
disuse of true secondaries will likely come increasing acceptance of COMI-
state law more generally, and so synthetic secondaries are a territorialist 
step backward for a universalist leap forward. 25  Ted Janger calls these 
proceedings an application of “virtual territoriality” 26  and others have 
offered the even more evocative label of “virtual contractual secondary 
proceedings.”27 Although we vary in our enthusiasm, we all arrive at the 
same place: all agree that synthetic secondaries are better than full 
secondaries (three cheers for the Collins & Aikman case, and more for 
Nortel),28 but even better would be no secondaries at all. 
 21. John A. E. Pottow, A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcies, 
46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 579, 584 (2011) [hereinafter Pottow, Secondary Proceedings] (“In sum, the 
most accurate understanding (from the normative perspective of a universalist) of secondary 
proceedings is that they are a necessary evil. They are required to dampen territorialist and 
competitive impulses.”). 
 22. Id. at 589 (declaring that future reform efforts should limit the scope of secondary 
proceedings to real property disputes, disputes where local judicial authority is needed to exercise 
equitable or other non-monetary bankruptcy-related relief, and other extraordinary circumstances 
pursuant to some safety valve escape clause).   
 23. Bob Wessels, Contracting Out of Secondary Insolvency Proceedings: The Main 
Liquidator’s Undertaking in the Meaning of Article 18 in the Proposal to Amend the EU 
Insolvency Regulation, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 235, 248 (2014). 
 24. Pottow, Secondary Proceedings, supra note 21, at 584 (“In other words, all that is 
advocated is a centripedal push of the activity of putative secondary proceedings to resolution in 
the COMI, without necessary change in actual outcome.”).   
 25. Aggressive universalist that I am, even I allow for secondary proceedings for certain 
matters such as in rem real property disputes, equitable proceedings under local law, etc. Id. 
 26. Janger, Virtual Territoriality, supra note 3.  
 27. Michael Menjucq & Reinhard Dammann, Regulation No. 1346/2000 on Insolvency 
Proceedings: Facing the Companies Group Phenomenon, 9 BUS. L. INT’L. 145, 154 (2008) (using 
the phrase “virtual contractual secondary proceedings” to describe the practice of providing 
creditors the same treatment as if secondary proceedings had been opened). 
 28. Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1343; Re Nortel Networks SA & 
ORS, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 206. 
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B. SECONDARY PROCEEDINGS: DOUBLING DOWN ON EVIL? 
Taking secondary proceedings as here for now, the current wave of EU 
reform—the proposals to amend the Regulation (ping-ponging back and 
forth between the EU Commission, Council, and Parliament) 29 —builds 
upon the assumption these proceedings will remain part of the procedural 
landscape for some time. The amendments, however, seek to “drastically” 
change the way secondary proceedings are to be used,30 but in a way that 
might give a universalist heartburn, namely, by expanding their incidence. 
Initially, this sounds like bad news for the modified universalist, but upon 
reflection the expansion as proposed should be encouraged. First, 
expanding the use of secondaries to non-liquidation purposes means that if 
the (normatively regrettable) local law veto is exercised, it at least need not 
lead to the winding up of the multinational subsidiary.31 Second, and more 
importantly, the expansion of the powers of the primary liquidator 
(insolvency representative) strengthens the notion of what I have called 
“jurisdictional hierarchy,” by expressly increasing the domains in which the 
COMI officer has dominance over the secondary proceeding officers, 
especially in corporate group proceedings.32 For example, the first right to 
propose a group-wide plan of reorganization vested in the COMI officer 
mirrors the U.S. chapter 11 concept of exclusivity that is specifically 
designed to empower debtors-in-possession in the domestic reorganization 
context.33 Third, and perhaps most exciting from a theoretical perspective, 
the recitals from the EU amendments contain all sorts of language (albeit in 
the maddening, compromise-laden generalities that constitute legal Euro-
speak) that recognize the ugly side of secondary proceedings. Thus, while 
there is still some encomium about the grand importance of protecting local 
creditors, there is also candid assessment that secondary proceedings can 
“hamper” reorganizations.34 
 29. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, COM (2012) 744 final (Dec. 
12, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal]; Draft Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency 
Proceedings, COM (2012) 0744 (Dec. 20, 2012)  (Parliament Draft Report). 
 30. Wessels, supra note 23, at 259. 
 31. Proposal, supra note 29, para. 5 (“[T]he requirement that secondary proceedings must be 
winding-up proceedings should be abolished.”).   
 32. Pottow, Secondary Proceedings, supra note 21, at 583.   
 33. Proposal, supra note 29, para. 45, art. 42(d)(1)(c) (empowering the liquidator with the 
right “to propose a rescue plan . . . for all or some members of the group for which insolvency 
proceedings have been opened and to introduce it into any of the proceedings opened with respect 
to another member of the same group”); 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2012) (“Except as otherwise 
provided in this section, only the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the 
order for relief under this chapter.”). 
 34. Proposal, supra note 29, para. 12, recital 19(a) (noting that the opening of secondary 
proceedings can “hamper the efficient administration of the estate”). 
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C. SUMMARY: DUBIOUS REFORM IN SEARCH OF A NORMATIVE 
ANCHOR 
Assessing the direction of the circulating EU amendments from a 
modified universalist perspective leads to a middling but passing grade 
regarding the change in the role of secondary proceedings. True, the recitals 
starting to call out the potential evils of secondaries are a step in the right 
direction, but some disappointments remain. At the most basic level, 
secondaries persist as an instantiation of choice of law veto. Additionally, 
and perhaps more importantly, there does not seem to be serious movement 
in the choice of law provisions; none of the amendments confronts the issue 
of the carve-outs from lex fori concursus. And most troublingly from the 
vantage of this Article’s ambitions, there is no apparent normative compass 
guiding these reforms. That is, for synthetic secondaries, the report simply 
recognizes generalized feedback from respondents to questionnaires 
expressing “dissatisfaction” with secondary proceedings; 35  it cites the 
success of Collins & Aikman as a workaround,36 but then shies away from 
striking a new path guided by a strong normative vision. Rather, the 
amendments seem to have restricted their changes to secondary proceedings 
(and other choice of law provisions) to the level of housekeeping: necessary 
and deft cleanups, to be sure, but nothing moving the ball forward in any 
significantly normative way. 37  This restricted scope is perhaps not 
surprising given the touchiness with which choice of law gets treated in 
insolvency. Consider the voluminous Legislative Guide (LG) propounded 
by UNCITRAL.38 While generally not bashful about offering prescriptive 
recommendations for domestic insolvency laws for countries seeking to 
update their regimes (including such micromanagement as spelling out 
super-majoritarian voting rules in reorganization proceedings), 39  the LG 
does not touch choice of law with a ten-foot pole, other than meekly 
suggesting that if countries want to persist in having priority payment 
provisions for preferred creditors in local law, they should minimize those 
unwelcome attributes of a bankruptcy law regime.40 
 
 35. Id. at 4 (noting that “half of the respondents were dissatisfied with the coordination 
between main and secondary proceedings.”). 
 36. Id. at 7.   
 37. I know, housekeeping was essentially the scope of its mandate, id. at 3 (noting that, after 
consultation with stakeholders and receipt of results of studies, improving efficiency was the 
primary objective of the revision of the Insolvency Regulation), so I’m not blaming the 
technocrats here—in fact, I think they did a great technocratic job. Ten points for Ravenclaw. 
 38. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY 
LAW, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2005) [hereinafter UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE]. 
 39. Id. recs. 145–151.   
 40. Id. rec. 187 (“The insolvency law should minimize the priorities accorded to unsecured 
claims.”). I would translate this into more direct speech thus: “We all know they’re just gravy 
trains for favored local lobbies, so if you have no shame and include them in your bankruptcy 
laws, at least be discreet about it and don’t do it too much.” 
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D.  FUMBLING TOWARD NORMATIVITY: THE GLOBAL PRINCIPLES 
ANNEX 
All of this discussion should lead the knowledgeable reader to want to 
explore the Global Principles Annex (GP Annex), with its comparatively 
ambitious agenda for a choice of law regime to supplement the EU 
Insolvency Regulation. 41  There, carve-outs abound as the modified 
universalist approach to choice of law.42 The GP Annex is certainly a bold 
innovation, but at the same time it too is unnecessarily timid in its embrace 
of modified universalism. That is, by its own terms, it worries that perhaps 
the provisions of EU Insolvency Regulation, and certainly the choice of law 
suggestions in the LG, are too universalist for international rollout, having 
too few carve-outs from COMI insolvency law for the Reporters’ comfort.43 
In that sense, the GP Annex is a theoretical step backward.44 Indeed, this 
reveals the greatest risk with an incrementalist reform system (procedural or 
otherwise). The glass half full narrative is that modest reforms will tear 
down sovereign mistrust and participant-actors’ skepticism of the evils of 
applying foreign insolvency law. The half empty narrative, however, is that 
these modest reforms will get readily enacted with self-congratulatory back-
slapping but then stall without further progress when the truly difficult 
sovereignty concessions have to be made (e.g., selection of priority and 
distribution rules).45 Worse, “critical carve-out mass” might be reached that 
encourages protectionist-minded lobbyists to seek to add their own carve-
outs into the mix, resulting in rent-seeking chaos and the loss of any 
universalist core.46 
Viewed from the half empty perspective, it is easy to dismiss the GP 
Annex as “just a bunch of carve-outs” and bemoan its increased carve-out 
usage when compared with other instruments. But that would be a mistake. 
Carefully analyzed, the carve-outs have a common normative thread. 
Indeed, the painstakingly crafted Comments and Reporters’ Notes to each 
 41. GP Annex, supra note 15, Statement of the Reporters.  
 42. E.g., id. r. 19–21 cmt. (“Based on perceived impressions of the importance of certain social 
policies and on several high-profile court cases, the Reporters believe that a [carve-out] rule of 
global application should be proposed with regard to current contracts of employment in case of 
the insolvency of the employer.”).  
 43. Id. Statement of the Reporters (“With respect, the Reporters consider that so limited a 
range of exceptions to the dominant role of the lex concursus is unlikely to prove commercially 
convenient or acceptable to the majority of parties engaged in international trade and business, 
given the present stage of uneven development of national laws governing such sensitive matters 
as security interests, set-off, and transaction avoidance.”).   
 44. Of course, the Reporters will fairly retort that they score a huge victory in scope—the 
intended reach of the GP Annex is to be universal, not just European—and so it can be argued that 
with wider scope and exposure to more diverse legal systems comes a necessary reduction in 
ambition regarding acceptance of universalist choice of law principles. 
 45. See Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 3, at 1012 (“[I]t might well be that as 
the cession of sovereignty gets increasingly painful, states will reach a balking point.”).   
 46. As an example, see The Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 6(d) (2013), enacted as 
11 U.S.C. § 365(n). 
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Rule in the GP Annex demonstrate that the drafters were trying to anchor 
each carve-out in a justified principle of insolvency or commercial law 
policy.47 The proposal of this Article is to draw that common normative 
thread out into the open and propose a unifying theme. Thus, this Article 
contends that the better approach is to use this normative vision to guide 
from the top-down an analysis of which, if any, carve-outs should exist 
from a strong lex fori concursus rule in a modified universalist regime, 
rather than justify which, if any, current carve-outs are theoretically 
defensible from a bottoms-up, issue-by-issue approach.48 
II. PROPOSED NORMATIVE FOCUS: PROTECTING 
DEFENSIVE RELIANCE INTERESTS. 
As a clarifying reminder, the normative focus proposed in this next 
section presupposes a modified universalist insolvency regime. That is, the 
most top-level normative framework is stipulated to be universalism; the 
transactional gains and operational simplicity are taken as givens in need of 
no further theoretical defense.49 But the modified universalist system allows 
clawback from this ideal, and as currently operationalized, that clawback is 
by way of carve-outs. Thus, the “lower-level” focus of this normative 
discussion is how best to design and identify the appropriate carve-outs. 
A. FIRST PRINCIPLES: PARTY RELIANCE 
As a starting point, then, we might blend the normative into the 
descriptive and examine the current carve-outs of the status quo (at least the 
status quo of current reform proposals). Looking at Rules 15 through 23 of 
the GP Annex that permit carve-outs to the lex fori concursus, such as “in 
rem” (security); 50  labor contracts; 51  set-off defenses; 52  and voidable 
transactions, 53  it is submitted that a common theme of reliance can be 
divined. For example, the avoidance carve-outs protect the party accused of 
a voidable transaction’s defense to avoidance available under local law.54 
The presumed reliance of a local worker to the protections accorded under 
domestic insolvency law is similarly vindicated.55 Broadening the focus of 
reliance to ex ante business expectations, it can also be argued (at least 
plausibly) that secured lenders equally rely upon the insolvency protections 
 47. GP Annex, supra note 15, cmts. passim. 
 48. The GP Annex takes a bottoms-up approach under this taxonomy. 
 49. See, e.g., Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 1, at 466; Lucian Arye Bebchuk 
& Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 
775 (1999). 
 50. GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 15.  
 51. Id. r. 20.  
 52. Id. r. 17.   
 53. Id. r. 22.  
 54. Id.   
 55. Id. r. 20.   
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of transaction-state law regarding rights upon default.56 Thus, the carve-outs 
from strict application of lex fori concursus can each, to a greater or lesser 
extent, be justified as protecting this “local law reliance interest.” This 
should not be a provocative position; the Reporters themselves frequently 
cite reliance interests in their commentary.57 
Accordingly, I propose that rather than have a reliance tail wagging the 
choice of law carve-out dog, we should promote reliance to the status of 
dog proper: reliance should become the necessary and (nearly) exclusive 
justification for a choice of law carve-out. That is, a more theoretically pure 
approach to insolvency choice of law would be to have a global rule that 
whenever a party to a transaction actually and reasonably relies upon the 
provisions of domestic insolvency law, that substantive law should govern 
resolution of an insolvency-related dispute. That pure a rule, however, is 
unlikely to come about. Even setting aside administrability concerns for 
present discussion, such a party-focused rule would be a radical departure 
from the interest-focused analysis of modern choice of law rules in many 
legal systems.58 Indeed, it even seems like a reversion to the vested rights 
approach of a bygone era, 59  perhaps prompting concern by private 
international law scholars that this would be the worst of all possible 
worlds.60 
Let me nevertheless defend this seemingly provocative normative 
stance from such global attack. First, “contacts”—really, state-based 
reliance interests—are not the proper reliance interests that should be 
protected in insolvency choice of law rules. (In earlier work, I have argued 
for a general carve-out in favor of local state insolvency law as a bone to 
throw to territorialists in the truest pragmatic spirit of modified 
 56. Id. r. 15–16 cmt. (“The extent to which the rights of a secured creditor are capable of being 
affected by the debtor’s insolvency is an essential aspect of the creditor’s assessment of the net 
risk to which he is exposed, and can have a significant bearing upon the decision whether to 
extend credit, and if so, on what terms.”).   
 57. Id. Statement of the Reporters (describing the “enhanced certainty and predictability of . . . 
outcomes” as “a worthwhile goal”). 
 58. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (articulating a “most 
significant contacts” test); see also id. cmt. c (articulating the principle that the law of the 
jurisdiction with the “most significant relationship” to a dispute should govern). 
 59. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1934). 
 60. See, e.g., J.H.C. Morris, Law and Reason Triumphant, or How Not to Review a 
Restatement, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 322, 330 (1973) (calling the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts 
“the most impressive, comprehensive and valuable work on the conflict of laws that has ever been 
produced in any country, in any language, at any time.”). However, the Restatement (Second) has, 
much as its predecessor, faced considerable criticism. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens 
of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 249, 253 (1992) (“Trying to be all things to all people, [the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts] produced mush.”); Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for A Third Conflicts 
Restatement (and A Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437, 448 (2000) (“Courts need and 
are entitled to more guidance than either the Second Restatement or the iconoclastic literature of 
the last two decades have provided.”). 
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universalism, 61  but here I am engaging in a more theoretically pure 
analysis.) Indeed, state interests are already well protected in the standard 
escape clause public policy exceptions within the universalist choice of law 
regimes,62 so it is hardly fair to suggest that party-focused reliance leaves 
state public policies out in the cold. Second, as will be revealed below, I am 
not necessarily against “presumed” party reliance as a back-door protection 
of state interests in certain policy-sensitive areas, such as labor rights, that 
have traditionally bedeviled multinational insolvency proposals. 63  (Some 
might label this a fudge, and there may be some force to that criticism, but I 
will counter their purity with pragmatism.) Accordingly, I am trying to 
capture the fairness-oriented concerns undergirding some, if not all, of the 
GP Annex exceptions in suggesting that party reliance—and not state 
reliance—should be elevated to become the proper focus of attention in 
crafting choice of insolvency law carve-out rules within a modified 
universalist system. 
B. SECOND PRINCIPLES: DEFENSIVE RELIANCE 
Even if the theoretical purity of an exclusively reliance-based choice of 
law regime could overcome pragmatism objections, it would still encounter 
challenges based on the multi-party nature of bankruptcy law.  Consider, for 
example, avoidance law. Creditor A, recipient of a voidable preference 
under COMI-state law, pleads that under the private international law rules 
of her state the obligation would be covered by home-state law, and under 
home-state law she has an absolute defense to avoidance. The GP Annex 
accommodates this “defendant reliance” by exempting the application of 
COMI state avoidance law to “save” the defendant from liability and 
thereby protect A’s legitimate legal expectations.64 An intrinsic fallacy with 
this approach, however, is a vividness focus on A’s interest to the extent of 
 61. John A. E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems of and 
Proposed Solutions to “Local Interests”, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1939 (2006) [hereinafter 
Pottow, Greed and Pride]. 
 62. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2012) (“Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to 
take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public 
policy of the United States.”). 
 63. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 2, rec. 11 (noting that the varying views on 
rights in rem and contracts of employment make it impractical to introduce insolvency 
proceedings that are universal in scope). 
 64. The GP Annex contains three examples demonstrating the application of Global Rules 22 
and 23. Two of those examples illustrate how the GP Annex “saves” creditors who rely on a 
certain state’s law from the application of COMI law. GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 22–23 cmt., 
Reporters’ Notes. Example (a) is the quintessential example of a creditor who relies on local law 
being saved from the application of COMI law by the GP Annex. Example (c) provides an 
example of how the GP Annex saves a creditor who structures a transaction relying on usage of 
trade, rather than local law. By contrast, example (b) illustrates how the GP Annex does not 
“save” creditors who do not rely on either local law or usage of trade. Instead, the GP Annex 
dictates that COMI law should apply if the only motive for structuring a transaction is to avoid the 
application of avoidance law. 
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diffuse-parties B through Z’s interests, represented by a bankruptcy trustee, 
liquidator, etc. Creditors B through Z surely have a fair retort that under 
COMI law they legitimately expect a bankruptcy estate will not be unfairly 
depleted by transactions of the sort that A just protected. Yet the GP Annex, 
following all major reforms to date, protects A at the expense of B through 
Z in the name of reliance.  
The vividness (or perhaps salience) bias of concentrated losses versus 
diffuse gains is not hard to understand in the realm of voidable transactions: 
the creditor who writes the cheque back to the bankruptcy estate smarts; the 
other creditors, whose unsecured dividend increases marginally as a result, 
may barely notice. To be sure, some gains are too diffuse to count: when a 
criminal defendant’s rights are violated securing a wrongful conviction, we 
generally do not talk about the diffuse gain received by having someone 
dangerous off the street. The real question, then, for bankruptcy, is not just 
what a given party relies upon in arranging its legal affairs, but whether that 
expectation is concentrated enough that it warrants special protection in the 
face of countervailing antithetical expectations of myriad other parties that 
will necessarily be compromised. Thus, mere incantations of “reliance,” on 
their own, cannot suffice to justify automatic legal protection; more 
searching scrutiny is required. 
To help sort the types of reliance and find those sufficiently special to 
warrant choice of law protection in bankruptcy, a subsidiary consideration 
might be deployed: whether the expectation should be considered 
“affirmative” or “defensive.” Let us revisit the sympathy one might have 
toward the voidable preference defendant.65 It is not just the concentration 
of loss upon the party that inclines us to offer protection but also the fact 
that it is a loss and not a gain. To be sure, technically this is swapping one 
cognitive bias (vividness) for another (endowment). But the law, perhaps to 
the lament of economists, privileges loss aversion in all sorts of ways that 
differ from gain protection. 66  I build happily upon that scaffolding in 
submitting that the sympathy accorded a voidable transaction recipient 
might markedly exceed that accorded, say, a secured transaction lender who 
was “legitimately expecting” State A’s law to allow it to have unqualified 
priority in insolvency and who would be disappointed to find that an 
insolvency proceeding under (COMI) State B’s law might surcharge that 
priority. The loss of a potential priority seems a different order of 
expectation to protect than being tagged with civil liability to disgorge a 
 65. Preference recipients are especially sympathetic under U.S. law because of their lack of 
culpability. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (voiding preference transfers under a strict liability regime). 
 66. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 829 (2012) (noting, 
for example, how the loss-focused law of tort gives rise to greater remedies than the law of unjust 
enrichment and how the Constitution’s Takings Clause limits the government’s power to take 
property without just compensation while no provision limits the government’s power to confer 
benefits). 
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“wrongful” transaction. We can thus conceive the use of reliance 
expectations in choice of law as a sword as being categorically different 
from their use as a shield, perhaps inclining us to protect the latter more 
than the former.67 
Accordingly, a focus on “defensive” reliance can help solve an 
especially prevalent reliance question in the bankruptcy context:  whose 
reliance? But that theoretical starting point is still not enough; the idea also 
needs to be implemented. That implementation can take several forms. At 
the cleanest level, if one wants to operationalize a defensive reliance-based 
normative framework for choice of law in the most theoretically pure 
manner, one could simply abolish all the carve-outs from COMI law that 
seem to grasp around reliance justifications and replace them with an 
omnibus reliance exception. To wit, global application of COMI law could 
be tempered by a freestanding exception as follows: “Any party who has 
actually and reasonably relied upon local insolvency law in conducting its 
affairs with the debtor shall not be subjected to the application of the 
COMI-state’s insolvency law.” This straightforward rule would not only 
adhere more directly to the normative principles I contend (rightly) 
undergird the present carve-outs but also have the additional attraction of 
drafting simplicity. Relaxing the need for theoretical purity, however, I 
might reject such a blanket rule and instead use the principle of defensive 
litigant reliance as a “framework” to guide further movement along the 
paths already blazed by current international insolvency instruments, such 
as the EU amendments or GP Annex. Path dependency has its virtues, and 
modified universalism, by definition, recognizes the desirability of 
pragmatics over purity. 
In Part IV, infra, I will suggest where such a framework leads, but 
first we must detour briefly to a reconsideration of the merits of so-called 
“bankruptcy contractualism.” This is not an indulgence. It is a discussion 
that is necessitated by the Article’s proposed normative refocus of cross-
border insolvency law onto reliance. 
III. INTERLUDE: CONTRACTUALISM RECONSIDERED 
If a normatively desirable approach to choice of insolvency law rules 
involves protecting legitimate party expectation, we run squarely into the 
world of contractualism, which espouses allowing parties freedom to 
 67. This example is not perfect. From the perspective of the disappointed secured creditor, 
there has been a “loss” of expected entitlement, but that loss still does not rise to the level of the 
disgorged preference recipient. Perhaps a better analogy might be that of the disappointed 
unsecured creditor who cajoled a trustee into pursuing a preference action that is subsequently 
abandoned. That “loss” clearly does not engage the same endowment concerns of the preference 
recipient’s disgorgement. 
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choose their own bankruptcy law regime.68 Assuming that such party choice 
is permissible (i.e., the contra-indicating policy concerns are put to rest),69 
then we have given away the choice of law farm. That is, if parties to a 
transaction have agreed contractually that the law, including the insolvency 
law, of State C will apply to any dispute arising out of a loan, then the 
COMI state’s law in insolvency proceedings is rendered irrelevant. This is 
not a problem if what we truly care about under our normative framework is 
protecting these parties’ legitimate expectations. In other words, it is 
difficult to adopt a normative approach to insolvency choice of law that 
centers on reliance without taking a stand (and presumably a strongly 
supportive one) on the merits of contractualism. 
Increasingly unfettered party autonomy in choice of law contracts is 
clearly gaining ascendency.70 Furthermore, in the international commercial 
context, courts have been especially permissive to forum selection 
clauses.71 Accordingly, it seems the anti-contractualist has an uphill battle 
in cabining the scope of free party choice between sophisticated legal actors 
of governing legal law. On the other hand, and for similar reasons to those 
discussed in the preceding section, the unique multi-party context of 
insolvency draws into sharp relief the very problem with extending the 
presumptively free governing force of party-selected choice of law clauses: 
insolvency is not just a proceeding between the parties to a contract. 
Bankruptcy involves many other parties not at the contracting table. 
Consider the example of a bank and debtor who agree to structure their loan 
subject to a choice of law rule that the insolvency law of State X, which 
subordinates tort claims, will apply. Both debtor and bank will happily 
lower the cost of credit at the expense of the non-present (and perhaps not-
yet-existent) tort victims.72 
American insolvency law guards against this concern of two parties’ 
control over the fate of the many, for example, by invalidating certain ex 
ante agreements to waive the automatic stay upon filing bankruptcy.73 Such 
 68. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private 
Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252 (2000). 
 69. For a discussion of countervailing concerns, see John A. E. Pottow, The Myth (and 
Realities) of Forum Shopping in Transnational Insolvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 785, 816 (2007) 
(pointing out that contractualism is systematically biased in favor of those creditors “likely to 
have, process, and credit-adjust to [] notice and [against] those likely to not”). 
 70. Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EC); Regulation 864/2007, 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC). 
 71. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).  
 72. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy Primitives, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 219, 243 (2004) 
(noting that shareholders and lenders can externalize risk on nonconsensual creditors and arguing 
that such creditors be given priority above even secured creditors). 
 73. E.g., Farm Credit of Cent. Florida, ACA v. Polk, 160 B.R. 870, 873 (M.D. Fla. 1993); In 
re Sky Grp. Int’l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 89 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (“To grant a creditor relief from 
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agreements between the debtor and a lender, courts reason, cannot bind the 
bankruptcy trustee, because the trustee enjoys the protection of the stay for 
the protection of all creditors. 
The GP Annex takes some good first steps to curb this potential for 
mischief by requiring some “connection” between State X and the parties to 
the loan. 74  As a practical matter, however, such connection is easy to 
concoct in a modern age. 75  Thus, unless a truly restrictive test for 
“connections” is set up—which is possible doctrinally, although not yet 
proposed—then the (utilitarian) policymaker has to confront the difficult 
task of weighing the benefits of vindication of party choice against the costs 
of third-party exclusion.76 
Three observations flow from and should guide resolution of this 
tension. First, if categorical exclusions can correctly anticipate ex ante all 
potentials for third-party abuse, then a free contractual choice regime can be 
defended. For example, Barry Adler has endorsed a system of bankruptcy 
contractualism with the precondition that all tort creditors have automatic 
priority for preferred distribution. 77  Second, vindicating party choice of 
forum and/or governing law need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. 
stay simply because the debtor elected to waive the protection afforded the debtor by the 
automatic stay ignores the fact that it also is designed to protect all creditors and to treat them 
equally. The orderly liquidation procedure contemplated by the Code would be placed in jeopardy, 
especially where (as here) none of the creditors who brought the involuntary petition was a party 
to the Agreement in which debtor allegedly waived its right to the automatic stay.”). 
 74. E.g., GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 16.1 (making Rule 15 on Secured Creditors inapplicable 
if the state where the assets are situated has no substantial relationship to the parties or the 
transaction); r. 18 (making Rule 17 on Set-off inapplicable if the law of the state chosen by the 
parties has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction); r. 23 (making Rule 22 on 
Defenses to Avoidance of Detrimental Acts inapplicable if proof is provided that the state whose 
law that applies has no “substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction”). 
 75. The European Parliament attempted to address this concern in insolvency cases involving 
groups by proposing a presumption that allows the application of a certain state’s law when a 
group member or members existing in that state contribute at least ten percent to the consolidated 
balance-sheet total and consolidated turnover. European Parliament, Comm. on Legal Affairs, 
Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, amend. 26(ja)(ii), 
(COM(2012)0744 – C7-0413/2012 – 2012/0360(COD)) (Nov. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Parliament 
Report]. 
 76. Even this analysis sidesteps the administrability concerns of multi-creditor negotiations. 
For a sobering analysis, see Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of 
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (2005). 
 77. Adler, supra note 72, at 243; see also Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu 
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 67 (1992) (“The question of the 
appropriate treatment of nonconsensual claimants when a firm is insolvent is the subject of a rich 
literature. This Article does not, and need not, enter this debate. Rather, once policymakers decide 
the optimal treatment of nonconsensual creditors, this treatment should be unalterable by any debt 
contract. In other words, the priority status of tort claimants should not depend on which 
bankruptcy option a firm selects. Thus, a bankruptcy regime consisting primarily of default rules 
can readily accommodate the existence of nonconsensual claimants.”); cf. Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 
1879 (1991) (arguing against even shareholder limited liability where plaintiff is tort victim). 
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Consider, for example, family law contracts (antenuptial, postnuptial, etc.). 
For some of the same reasons as insolvency law (implication of the rights of 
non-contracting third parties, i.e., children),78 many domestic systems will 
give only presumptive—not dispositive—weight to the parties’ 
contractually expressed preferences for legal distributions. 79  A similar 
presumption-based approach to contractualism could be deployed in multi-
national insolvency to see if the hypothetically exploited tort victim actually 
arises in any given case. Third, harkening back to the distinction earlier 
about parties’ expectations serving as either a sword or a shield, choice of 
law rules could be otherwise less solicitous to party choice involving 
preferred distribution (swords) to ones involving defensive protections from 
liability (shields). 80  This third point blends with the second point to 
underscore that a “looser” approach to vindicating party expectation as 
expressed through contracted choice of law clauses can indeed be 
justified—even in a context of extra-party concerns. 
IV.  DEPLOYING A RELIANCE-BASED CHOICE OF LAW 
FRAMEWORK. 
Earlier I proposed how a theoretically pure reliance-based choice of law 
principle might be implemented as a categorical rule. Now it is time, as 
modified universalism commands, to relax the commitment to theoretical 
purity and build upon the incrementalist path already laid out by prior 
 78. Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 887, 898 (1997) (“The most common types of provisions that courts have held invalid 
contravening public policy concern children, including waiver of child support, custody, or 
visitation rights.”); see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-35 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (“A 
premarital or pre-civil union agreement shall not adversely affect the right of a child to support.”); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-36d (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (“The right of a child to 
support may not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement. Any provision relating to the 
care, custody and visitation or other provisions affecting a child shall be subject to judicial review 
and modification.”). 
 79. For example, in the United Kingdom, prenuptial agreements are not legally binding. 
Courts retain broad discretion to distribute family assets as they see fit, so as to bring about 
fairness between the couple. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, §§ 23–24 (U.K.). A prenup is 
merely one of the factors the court will take into account when distributing assets. Id. § 7. Similar 
issues arise regarding forum selection clauses. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 
(1988) (viewing enforcement not as a question of contract formation, but instead as a question of 
whether the action should be transferred from a noncontractual forum to the contractual forum 
depending upon the factors outlined in the transfer of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012), 
namely, convenience of parties and witnesses and “the interest of justice”). 
 80. This final point may need some unpacking. A contract necessarily involves at least two 
actors, and so one party’s shield may be another’s sword. My thinking here is that parties might 
structure a transaction to provide protection from avoidance under (appropriate) local law. 
Accordingly, a logical extension of the argument advanced in this Article regarding the role 
reliance should play in choice of cross-border insolvency law is that a general theory of 
bankruptcy contractualism should be embraced. So long as “embraced” allows cautious 
application of the principles derived from the theory and not a full-throated commitment to “the 
contract trumps all,” then this Article’s author approves and endorses the logical extension of this 
Article’s arguments! 
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efforts in the field. We can go through some of the current carve-outs, such 
as those relating to set-offs and labor laws, both to see how they fare under 
our reliance-focused framework and to make appropriate remedial 
recommendations as needed. 
A. SET-OFF 
To start, let us consider the case of set-off. After a comprehensive 
discussion, the Reporters of the GP Annex adopted the exception from lex 
fori concursus for a local state set-off law in circumstances when set-off is 
allowed by the passive claim’s law. 81  This is basically a defendant-
protective position based on reliance. Note that other approaches could have 
been proposed that would vindicate different policies. For example, one 
could have proposed allowing a set-off only if both COMI law and local 
law allow for set-off. This would be considered a “debtor-protective” stance 
(or, equally, an “anti-set-off” stance); both of those positions can be 
justified normatively as a matter of policy, but not on the reliance grounds 
advanced here. Similarly, one could have suggested allowing a set-off if 
either COMI or local law allows. While promoting a plausible normative 
policy (maximal creditor self-help in bankruptcy), this approach similarly 
cannot be said to follow reliance vindication. 
Against this backdrop, it might be assumed that the GP Annex set-off 
exception scores well on this Article’s proposed framework. It does, but it 
also does not. First, the positive: by focusing on the defendant’s local law,82 
the exception properly restricts itself to the domain of “protective” 
expectations, which vindicates defensive reliance. The reason for 
withholding full marks, however, is that the carve-out assumes that the 
creditor has, in fact, relied on that local law (or, even more precisely, 
assumes that the creditor relied upon the non-application of COMI law in 
lending to the debtor). While of course administrability concerns might 
justify an approach of such presumed reliance, a modified universalist 
should want to minimize carve-outs as much as possible to maximize the 
reach of COMI-law rule.83 Accordingly, a better approach would be one 
that allows defenses to COMI law not when they are presumed, but only 
when they are actually needed. This might be considered “calling the 
reliance bluff” of the putative setter-off. Indeed, this consideration is 
already cogently mentioned in the Reporters’ notes, where they ask whether 
set-off should be allowed upon its entitlement under passive claim law or  
 81. GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 17.  
 82. I realize this discussion frames set-off as an attack on a defendant. Of course, it could also 
be characterized as a privilege accorded the setter-off. I think it is nevertheless fair to think of an 
offsetting creditor as resisting payment of its claim to the estate and hence as a putative defendant. 
(If not, the analysis of this discussion can be carried over to preference recipients.) 
 83. Pottow, Secondary Proceedings, supra note 21, at 588–89.  
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whether there should be a further requirement that the party invoking set-
off must show that such a right has formed part of its legitimate 
expectations arising in the context of the lending relationship between the 
creditor and the insolvent debtor, so as to have been part of the calculation 
of risk during the process of becoming a creditor on the terms agreed.84 
Yes, of course it should. The setter-off is the one who wants the Get-Out-
of-COMI-Free Card; let the burden lie accordingly.85 
Thus, a better rule under the suggested normative framework of this 
Article would be to amend Rule 17 of the GP Annex to read something like 
this for the conditions of allowing set-off: “If set-off is permitted by the law 
applicable to the insolvent debtor’s claim and the party with the right to set-
off demonstrates it relied upon the application of that law to the exclusion 
of the law of the state of the main insolvency proceeding in lending to the 
debtor.” For those tut-tutting on administrability grounds that such an 
approach necessarily draws a fact-intensive debate into each set-off claim, I 
threaten them with offering an alternative reformulation that is less likely to 
ground viable litigation: “and the offsetting party demonstrates it was 
unaware of the debtor’s COMI.” That way, the truly “local” creditors who 
are purportedly unsophisticated in dealing with multinational conglomerates 
would get a pass, but the rest would be bound by the Gebhard maxim of 
when you do business with a foreign company, you know you’re getting 
yourself into foreign law.86 In the spirit of incrementalism, if the alternative 
proposal is deemed too aggressive for the present state of affairs, consider it 
a negotiating anchor to make the primary proposal seem more reasonable! 
More seriously, if we want to circumscribe normatively well grounded rules 
doctrinally by functional considerations—an eminently sensible impulse—
then such “cut-offs” should not just be expeditious (e.g., no carve-out for 
 84. GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 17–18 cmt.  
 85. I am unapologetic that this apparently reverses the British Parliament’s statutory semi-
overruling of Forster v. Wilson, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1165. In Forster, one Wilson was in debt to 
a bank that had gone bankrupt. He acquired several classes of £5 notes payable from the bank to 
the bearer. Some of the notes were from customers on account of antecedent debt and other notes 
provided that “the defendants were to pay so much only as they should receive from the assignees 
. . . .” Wilson argued that he had a right to set-off for all classes of notes. The Court held that 
Wilson and his co-defendants possessed the latter class of notes solely as trustees for third parties. 
In essence, they themselves had not relied on the notes. The purpose of the right of set-off, the 
court said, is to do “substantial justice” between the parties, “where a debt is really due from the 
bankrupt to the debtor to his estate.” In this case, the court found the latter classes of notes were 
not debts that were due since the defendants were to pay only as much as they received. Since 
there was no reliance, the defendants did not have a right of set-off as to those notes. When it 
enacted a set-off statute, Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 323 (Eng.), the British Parliament allowed 
for the assignment of claims while eschewing the analysis of the court in Forster. Cf. Stein v. 
Blake, [1996] A.C. 243 (declaring that the right of set-off is automatic and self-executing). 
 86. Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 537 (1883) (“[E]very person who deals with 
a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself to such laws of the foreign government, affecting 
the powers and obligations of the corporation with which he voluntarily contracts, as the known 
and established policy of that government authorizes.”). 
                                                                                                                           
18
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 115 [2015]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/115
214 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 9 
creditors whose names begin with “P”), but should be guided by principles 
themselves furthering the higher-level ideal (here, universalism).  In this 
specific instance, therefore, one could respond to concerns of excessive 
litigation with an evidentiary presumption. Given the universalist reluctance 
toward carve-outs, in this case that presumption could be that the defendant 
did not rely on local law. (If that rule were thought to be too broad, further 
tweaks could be added: e.g., a presumption of no local law reliance for a 
creditor whose COMI is outside the local jurisdiction, a counter-
presumption of local law reliance for a creditor who conducts business 
solely within the local jurisdiction, etc.). 
In sum, the GP Annex carve-out for set-off is consistent with this 
Article’s framework; to be fully consonant, however, it should include an 
actual reliance test. 
B. LABOR LAW 
Labor law presents a different challenge, because here it is harder to 
justify a lex fori concursus carve-out from an expectations-based normative 
lens. In fact, it stretches the fiction of legal knowledge to its breaking point. 
(As an informal self-survey, I can attest I was unaware of any insolvency 
labor entitlements until I became employed as a bankruptcy professor.)87 
Rather, the labor law carve-out is for “certain social policies,” as the GP 
Annex Reporters candidly admit.88 In fact, the EU Insolvency Regulation 
reveals the inappositeness of expectations to its rule by saying point-blank 
that the justification of the labor law carve-out is “in order to protect 
employees and jobs.” 89  To be clear, pro-labor is a perfectly defensible 
insolvency law policy—indeed, I have argued elsewhere for the 
permissibility of such a policy-based carve-out from lex fori concursus90—
but a lex laboris carve-out cannot honestly be justified on the grounds of 
protecting expectations.91 Consider: if the purpose of the carve-out is, as the 
 87. By contrast, I suspect most directors and officers are acutely aware of their 
responsibilities—and defenses—under local law. For this reason, and for the desire to favor 
“defensive” carve-outs from lex fori concursus, a reliance-based choice of law regime would 
protect local officers from liability if entitled to immunity under local law regardless of COMI 
law. Indeed, “presumed reliance” might even be an appropriate evidentiary standard. 
 88. GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 19–21 cmt. (“Based on perceived impressions of the 
importance of certain social policies and on several high-profile court cases, the Reporters believe 
that a rule of global application should be proposed with regard to current contracts of 
employment in case of the insolvency of the employer.”).  
 89. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 2, rec. 28 (“In order to protect employees and jobs, 
the effects of insolvency proceedings on the continuation or termination of employment and on 
the rights and obligations of all parties to such employment must be determined by the law 
applicable to the agreement in accordance with the general rules on conflict law.”). 
 90. Pottow, Secondary Proceedings, supra note 21, at 589.   
 91. The Legislative Guide gamely tries. The rationale for the lex laboris carve-out, according 
to the Guide, is “protecting the reasonable expectations of employees with respect to their contract 
of employment, recognizing that workers may have a relatively weaker bargaining position than 
their employer, and ensuring non-discrimination amongst workers working in the same state, 
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EU Insolvency Regulation intones, to protect jobs, then a COMI rule that 
was more protective of employees than local insolvency law should be 
enthusiastically embraced rather than subordinated by carve-out. Yet to be 
theoretically consistent, one interested in protecting expectations alone 
would try to “save” the local workers in such a situation by restricting them 
to the more limited benefits of local law—all to vindicate their purported 
expectations. I doubt many laborers would begrudge being treated 
“discriminatorily” from other domestic workers by the application of more 
favorable COMI law in these circumstances.92 
The lex laboris rule is even more confusing when it is coupled with the 
ambition of the GP Annex that priority payout not be carved out from the 
application of lex fori concursus. 93 This means the “insolvency effects” 
carve-out from COMI law is limited to presumably such matters as ipso 
facto termination of labor agreements but not—which one might predict 
many employees owed back wages care about—priority distribution. 94 
While I applaud this carve-out-within-a-carve-out approach (indeed, it 
comports with an approach I have commended earlier), 95  it once again 
seems intellectually difficult to square with a reliance-based normative 
mission. Either the workers legitimately expect the application of local 
law—with the full panoply of its insolvency goodies—or they do not. This 
hybrid approach surely cannot be founded on a fine empirical line between 
just what they do expect and what they don’t. Rather, it is a policy balance: 
this is what they can rely on, but no more. Again, to belabor the point, I do 
not object to this line-drawing-cum-sausage-making; my intention simply is 
to underscore the tension between policy-driven compromises, such as the 
current lex laboris concursus, and more normatively driven approaches, be 
they animated by substantive policies (e.g., protecting employees) or more 
“meta” legal principles (e.g., protecting reliance). 
Employment contracts are the most politically sensitive area of 
insolvency choice of law discussion, perhaps next to secured credit. 96 
Accordingly, my modified universalist inclination is to defer subjugation to 
whether they are employed by a local or by a foreign employer.” UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE 
GUIDE, supra note 38, at 70 (emphasis added). 
 92. Pottow, Greed and Pride, supra note 61, at 1914 (“[W]e cannot say with certainty whether 
the content of local law on its own inclines legally privileged creditors toward universalism or 
territorialism; we can only say with certainty that it inclines them toward the application of the 
most favorable law.”).  
 93. GP Annex, supra note 15, r. 20.  
 94. Cf. Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1343 (suggesting such priority 
distributions motivate restructuring plan design). 
 95. Pottow, Secondary Proceedings, supra note 21, at 589.  
 96. See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 38, at 131 (“[T]he relationship between 
employee and employer raises some of the most difficult questions in insolvency law . . . . The 
difficult question is generally the extent to which [non-insolvency statutory] provisions will have 
an impact on the insolvency, raising issues that are much broader than termination of the contract 
and priority of monetary claims . . . .”). 
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COMI state law for as long as possible along the incrementalist path; I 
would let states apply local state law to local workers as and not push the 
envelope. The problem is fitting that within my normative framework. I 
have two choices on how to do so (absent hypocrisy): first, I can repair to 
categorical treatment and simply say that for policy reasons, labor law is 
“off the table” for universalist choice of law subject to reliance-based carve-
outs. Second, I can try to shoehorn the lex laboris rules suggested thus far 
into a reliance, or at least “deemed” reliance, analysis. My critique above 
portends an uphill battle.97 Worse, deemed reliance drags me into the very 
quagmire I criticize the British Parliament for regarding set-off 
expectations. In part for that reason, I would recommend treating 
employment contracts as a straight-out categorical exception—yes, a carve-
out (a meta-carve-out?)—from the approach espoused in this Article. 
Especially if the carve-out does not encompass priority distribution along 
the lines of the GP Annex approach, it seems justifiable on an 
“extraordinary state interests” ground (i.e., control of the labor markets, 
minimizing pitchfork-based uprisings, etc.). 98  Nothing precludes such a 
“policy overlay” upon an otherwise reliance-based regime, especially in a 
world of modified universalism. 
One point of reflection in closing on this possible cop-out: a decade or 
two ago, were I writing this same assessment, I would have assumed that 
tax priorities fell into the same sensitive policy domain and would have to 
be carved out from the lex fori concursus for political necessity.99 Now, tax 
priorities are being abolished left and right; they do not even make the list 
of carve-outs under many of the proposals to date.100 So some qualification 
might be in order regarding my pessimism for the universalization of 
employee rights. They too may change with time. But for now, discretion is 
the better part of valor. 
C. SECURITY INTERESTS 
Rights in rem are mostly subject to a registration system, and so the 
contractualist analysis above governs whether to require actual reliance on 
non-COMI law in light of this registration. While of course a modified 
 97. See supra discussion accompanying notes 91–92. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Barbara K. Morgan, Should the Sovereign Be Paid First? A Comparative International 
Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 461–62 (2000) 
(asserting that a fundamental question that a country attempting to develop a bankruptcy system 
must face is whether tax claims should be subject to insolvency laws and, if so, to what extent tax 
claims should be afforded priority treatment); see also INT’L INSOLVENCY INST., REPORT ON TAX 
CLAIMS (2005) (surveying differing national treatments of tax claims in insolvency proceedings); 
cf. AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES 13 (2003) 
(recommending that rather than adopt parallel legislation regarding treatment of tax claims, such 
claims should be the subject of an international agreement). 
 100. See, e.g., The Enterprise Act, 2002, § 251 (U.K.) (abolishing the priority of the Crown). 
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universalist would like to subject these claims to COMI law as well (absent 
actual reliance) and eliminate the carve-out—bristling at the 
characterization of what is essentially a bankruptcy distribution priority as 
an inviolable property right—I am less insistent, given the careful 
distinctions already addressed by the Reporters and others between what 
might and what might not rise to the level of truly violating “rights in rem.” 
Thus, for example, a limited moratorium on the realization of the security 
interest that holds the secured creditor at bay for a bit may not even be a 
“violation” of rights in rem so long as the underlying lien remains 
preserved. 101  If so, then the value-destructive risk of leaving secured 
creditors with unfettered rights to pull the plug on a reorganization 
proceeding afoot under a debtor-protective COMI law becomes less 
worrisome, because the (protective) stay would escape carve-out treatment. 
For non-registered charges, however, I would revert to the requirement of 
demonstrating actual reliance and/or lack of knowledge of the foreign 
COMI of the debtor. (Real property, for path-dependent jurisprudential 
reasons, can stick with a strict lex situs rule.)102 
 
*                                 *                                 * 
 
In sum, the modified universalist following a normative framework of 
reliance-based exceptions to lex fori concursus would counsel restricting 
the carve-outs to demonstrated instances of actual, defensive reliance. Such 
a framework could additionally accommodate, or at least not be 
intellectually embarrassed by, residual carve-outs for certain extraordinary 
policy categories (such as labor rights) or historically rooted categories 
(such as the situs rule for real property). Finally, a reliance-based regime 
could also tolerate a role for contractual choice of law selection, which may 
in reality functionally eclipse any secured credit rules, if the contracts were 
held in check and given presumptive, but not dispositive force, with careful 
scrutiny of adverse third-party effects. Two closing comments on 
administration and forum shopping seem in order. On administration: some 
instances of “deemed reliance” would not be antithetical to this Article’s 
normative enterprise. Perhaps creditors of a certain size or whose operations 
do not transcend national borders could be deemed to have relied on local 
law per se.103 American bankruptcy law has all sorts of “small potatoes” 
exceptions and flatters itself still to be intellectually coherent.104 Similarly, 
 101. GP Annex, supra note 15, at 39 (asserting that a temporary moratorium does not interfere 
with the right in rem itself but merely affects the exercising of the right). 
 102. Pottow, Secondary Proceedings, supra note 21, at 588–89 n.63.  
 103. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) (2012) (defining “small business debtor”); see also Wessels, 
supra note 23, at 39 (discussing the need for a definition of localization in Article 2(g) of the EU 
Insolvency Regulation and proposing some possibilities). 
 104. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(8)–(9) (excepting from preference attack transactions below a certain 
dollar amount).  
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for policy reasons we might, or might not, want to deem individual 
directors to have relied upon the defenses of local corporate law. The key 
point is to countenance some sliding by through a flexible conception of 
reliance for smaller fish but call the reliance bluff for other, larger, more 
sophisticated creditors, who often don’t in reality truly rely on the 
provisions of local law at all when dealing with an international debtor, but 
rather use a choice of law arbitrage potential to gain strategic advantage. 
Secondly, on forum shopping: much debate between universalism and 
territorialism has centered on the ability to police or facilitate forum 
shopping. 105  One of the vectors of complaint has been the difficulty in 
situating assets (under territorialism) and determining a debtor’s COMI 
(under universalism).106 The approach of this Article—by allowing in some 
instances the persistence of carve-outs—at one level is the worst of all 
worlds because it requires both the situation of assets and the location of 
COMI. That is, however, a necessary outcome of the pragmatics of 
modified universalism. 
CONCLUSION. 
Choice of law in multinational bankruptcy proceedings stands at an 
important crossroads. While universalism has gained an intellectual 
foothold, the realities of the modern political landscape require its 
deployment at present only in modified form. But the degree of how much 
to “modify” universalism back into territorialism is now under discussion. 
The scope and extent of COMI law carve-outs are being examined by 
international institutions, such as UNCITRAL, that stand ready to advance 
further reform. 107  Within these confines, this Article has proposed a 
normative approach centered on reliance: rather than vague exhortations to 
the importance of protecting “local creditors,” explicit requirement should 
be made for actual, defensive reliance on the application of local law to the 
exclusion of COMI law before a litigant may evade the lexi fori concursus. 
Yet rather than be fully committed to the normative implications of this 
argument—having a general rule of actual reliance cutting across all choice 
of law circumstances—this Article further aligns itself with the modified 
universalist project of incremental reform and prefers to build upon extant 
regimes; wheel re-inventing is neither welcome nor required. As such, this 
Article proposes to apply the reliance-based rule only in the subset of 
instances already identified as appropriate areas for carve-out. In a similar 
vein, this framework will bow to the political necessities of modified 
universalism and tolerate limited policy-based categorical carve-outs to 
 105. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Financial Distress: The Last Hurrah of 
Territorialism, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 321 (2006); Lynn M. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control?, 79 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 79 (2005). 
 106. Pottow, supra note 69. 
 107. Working Group V (Insolvency Law), supra note 13. 
                                                                                                                           
23
Pottow:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2015
2014] Beyond Carve-outs and Toward Reliance 219 
persist, such as lex laboris. It is submitted that this new framework, with its 
focus on reliance and actual legitimate expectations, in addition to enjoying 
intellectual consistency, will ultimately serve a cabining effect on putative 
carve-outs by reserving the application of non-COMI law only when truly 
“required.” More importantly, the axis of cabining is one of principle, and 
so those left behind will be hard-placed to criticize the advance (i.e., when 
someone does not, in fact, rely on local law, it is hard to demand from a 
moral high ground that he should nevertheless enjoy the windfall of local 
law on bankruptcy distribution in a multi-jurisdictional proceeding). This 
new approach to choice of insolvency law can thus further the ultimate top-
level normative goal: a truly universalist cross-border insolvency system. 
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